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I.

Introduction and Summary of Conclusions
a.

Issue
The Rome Statue of the International Criminal Court finally entered into force on July 1,

2002, 1 after decades of delay and fully another decade of long and arduous preparation.2 The
International Criminal Court (ICC) has received and accepted a total of four referrals of
“situations” to date, three of which have been “self-referrals,” where the State Party on or in
whose territory the alleged crimes have occurred or are occurring referred the situation to the
ICC.3 The drafters of the Rome Statute for the ICC assumed that no State Party would ever
actually self-refer,4 despite implicitly providing for such action in the Rome Statute,5 and a
current situation has presented the Court with a second unexpected twist. President Yoweri
Museveni of Uganda, having made the first-ever State Party referral to the ICC in the name of
Uganda in December 2003,6 suddenly announced in November 2004 that Uganda might
“withdraw” its case from the ICC, in order to make peace with the rebel Lord’s Resistance

1

Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court, July 17, 1998, 37 I.L.M. 999 [hereinafter ICC
Statute], available at http://www.icc-cpi.int/library/about/officialjournal/Rome_Statute_English.pdf
[reproduced in the accompanying notebook at Tab 1]

2

For a brief introduction and history of the ICC Statute, see Rome Statute of the International Criminal
Court: Overview, at http://www.un.org/law/icc/general/overview.htm

3

See generally International Criminal Court: Situations and Cases, at http://www.icc-cpi.int/cases.html

Mahnoush H. Arsanjani and W. Michael Reisman, Developments at the International Criminal Court:
The Law-in-Action of the International Criminal Court, 99 AM. J. INT'L L. 385, 386-387 [reproduced in
the accompanying notebook at Tab 56]

4

5

ICC Statute, supra note 1, art. 14(1) [reproduced in the accompanying notebook at Tab 1]

6

International Criminal Court Press Release, President of Uganda refers situation concerning the Lord’s
Resistance Army (LRA) to the ICC, 29 January 2004, ICC-200401299-44-En [reproduced in the
accompanying notebook at Tab 34]

1

Army.7 The Rome Statute, however, does not appear to provide for such a withdrawal. By now,
the ICC and its Chief Prosecutor have invested substantial resources over the past three years
investigating and preparing the case for trial. Two observers have noted that “a withdrawal in
these circumstances would incur a considerable loss of credibility for the Court and would
represent a defeat for the policy against impunity, the principle that animates the very idea of the
Court.”8
This memorandum addresses the consequent issue: What if a State, self-referring or
otherwise, changes its mind and attempts to “withdraw” an ICC referral? What is the role of the
ICC at that point? This issue becomes especially relevant and pressing as events in Uganda
unfold and the possibility grows of an attempted “withdrawal” of Uganda’s referral. This memo
therefore aims to analyze the Rome Statute, the draft history, and the expert commentaries,
together with the statutory and case law of the other major human rights courts and bodies, and
the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, to consider in-depth whether a State Party can
withdraw a referral from the ICC.

b.

Summary of Conclusions
i.

The Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court does not provide for
withdraw of a referral

Strictly speaking, the plain language of the Rome Statute simply does not allow for a
State to withdraw a referral made to the ICC. The few mentions of withdrawal in the Rome

ICC MAY DROP LRA CHARGES, New Vision (Uganda) (15 November 2004) [reproduced in the
accompanying notebook at Tab 62]

7

8

Arsanjani and Reisman, supra note 4, at 397 [reproduced in the accompanying notebook at Tab 56]

2

Statute do not relate to withdrawal form the Statute. The one article dealing solely with
withdrawal from the treaty instead ensures that States Parties remain bound to their existing
obligations. The Statute explicitly forbids withdrawal of a referral when withdrawal is examined
instead as a State Party’s unilateral attempt to take criminal jurisdiction away from the Court.

ii.

The draft history of the Rome Statute similarly contains no discussion of
withdrawal and makes no allowance for withdrawal

The draft history of the Rome Statute, like the Statue itself, does not address withdrawal,
contains no discussion of withdrawal, and makes no allowance for withdrawal of a referral. The
drafters did not address the possibility in part due to the assumption that no State Party would
ever self-refer a situation to the Court of crimes occurring on or in its own territory; the
confusion over the issue of withdrawal of a referral is itself the product of the unexpected selfreferral phenomenon. On the other hand, the draft history demonstrates the drafters intent,
reflected in the Rome Statute, to bind States Parties to their obligations under the Statute and
refrain for the Court the power to determine jurisdiction over matters referred to it.

iii.

One international court has established the limited possibility for withdrawal
of a referral

The Inter-American Court of Human Rights recognized a withdrawal of a referral by the
Inter-American Commission under within the very narrow temporal window between the when a
referral is made to the Court and when the Court actually exercises its jurisdiction over that case
or referral. This limited possibility for withdrawal logically translates to the ICC, given the
similar procedural regimes of the two courts. The Prosecutor of the ICC has no reason not to

3

recognize this very limited form of withdrawal, consider the flexibility and versatility that the
Prosecutor has shown with the Rome Statute to date. This recognition does not diminish the
power or the nature of the Court and may reassure those States that already fear the powers and
independence of the Court and its Prosecutor.

iv.

Otherwise, every other international human rights body rejects the concept
of unilateral withdrawal, termination, or modification

Otherwise, however, the statutory and treaty bases for every other major international
human rights body, as well as the case history and legal analysis of every other major
international human rights court or adjudicative body, strongly support the implications in the
Rome Statute and its draft history in favor of an international court’s control over its own
jurisdiction and opposed to the unilateral withdrawal by a State of its obligations under a treaty.
The Inter-American Court in particular has gone to great lengths to elevate the status and the
protections afforded to human rights treaties and establish that withdrawal is a particularly
damaging act in the face of such treaties. The findings of these other international courts and
bodies and their statutes naturally apply to the ICC, in light of the human rights implications of
the ICC’s own Statute and the Rome Statute’s specific call for the application of law with regard
internationally recognized human rights.

v.

The Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties as applied to the Rome
Statute also fails to establish the possibility for withdrawal of a referral from
the ICC

4

The Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties also fails to establish the possibility for
withdrawal of a referral when applied to the Rome Statute. The Vienna Convention is the
natural tool for addressing this issue, considering its consistent use by other international human
rights bodies in the same context. In fact, taken together with the holdings of the international
courts, the Vienna Convention overwhelmingly finds against the possibility of withdrawal.

vi.

An actual attempted withdrawal would not change the role of the ICC

An actual attempt to withdraw a referral by a State Party would not likely change the role
of the ICC. The Rome Statute was drafted with the expectation of conflict and dispute over
issues of complementarity and sovereignty and with the knowledge that the Court has no
recourse in the fact of a non-compliant State Party. However, as the Prosecutor has successfully
and deftly maintained a non-adversarial policy of cooperation with States Parties thus far, an
attempted withdrawal does not necessarily infer a fight.

vii.

Uganda, the cause of the confusion over the issue of withdrawal, will not
likely attempt to withdraw their own referral from the ICC

Finally, Uganda, whose President made the first ever referral as well as the first ever selfreferral to the ICC, and whose statements raised the very spectre of withdrawal that this
memorandum addresses, is unlikely to actually attempt to withdraw its own referral. Ugandan
government officials have consistently and repeatedly indicated that they understand the proper
procedural requirements for challenging the admissibility and jurisdiction of a case and that they
will not actually try to wrest control of their referral back from the Court.

5

II.

Factual Background
a.

Current Referrals, Situations, and Declarations before the ICC

In December 2003, Ugandan President Museveni “took the decision to refer the situation
concerning the Lord’s Resistance Army to the Prosecutor of the International Criminal Court,” 9
marking the first-ever State Party referral to the fledgling ICC of a situation occurring on the
State Party’s own territory. President Museveni sought a new option for ending the horrors
inflicted upon the people of northern Uganda after twenty-plus years of civil war with the rebel
LRA and faced with “persistent international indifference coupled with the exhaustion of
available alternatives.”10 After the Prosecutor officially opened an investigation into the
situation, however, President Museveni unexpectedly announced in November 2004 that Uganda
might “withdraw its case” from the ICC, having recently negotiated a partial ceasefire and
possible peace negotiations with the LRA leaders.11
Museveni’s claim drew immediate outcry from human rights groups and the international
community. Amnesty International quickly noted that
there is not a scrap of evidence in the drafting history or in commentaries by
leading international law experts on the Rome Statute suggesting that once a state
party has referred a situation that it can ‘withdraw’ the referral. As soon as the
situation has been referred, the ICC has jurisdiction and the state cannot
‘withdraw’ its referral.12
9

ICC Press Release, Uganda, supra note 6 [reproduced in the accompanying notebook at Tab 34]

Payam Akhavan, The Lord's Resistance Army Case: Uganda's Submission of the First State Referral to
the International Criminal Court, 99 AM. J. INT'L L. 403, 410 [reproduced in the accompanying notebook
at Tab 60]

10

ICC MAY DROP LRA CHARGES, supra note 6 [reproduced in the accompanying notebook at Tab 62].
M. Cherif Bassiouni has suggested that this statement itself is “tantamount to a withdrawal of the
referral.” M. Cherif Bassiouni, The ICC – Quo Vadis?, ICJ 4 3 (421) [reproduced in the accompanying
notebook at Tab 55]

11

12

Amnesty International Press Release, Uganda: Government cannot prevent the International Criminal
Court from investigating crimes (16 November 2004) [reproduced in the accompanying notebook at Tab
63]

6

While this claim seems logical given the absence of any clear language in the Rome Statute
regarding withdrawal of a referral, Amnesty did not provide any detailed analysis to support their
conclusion. Since these events, no other clear analysis of the issue of withdrawal has emerged,
and the Prosecutor has since issued warrants for the tope five LRA leaders.13 However, these
leaders have seized upon Museveni’s statement and repeatedly insisted that they will not consent
to peace or any other settlement until the referral is withdrawn and the ICC warrants are
dropped.14 President Museveni therefore can claim the dubious honor of having created the
current confusion over withdrawal of a referral and imperiled the entire ICC referral procedure.
Three other referrals have been made to the ICC subsequent to the initial Ugandan
referral. The Democratic Republic of the Congo and the Central African Republic have each
also referred situations occurring within their own territory, in April 200415 and January 2005,16

Museveni Wants LRA Warrants - For Now, Institute for War & Peace Reporting/AllAfrica.com (27 July
2007) [reproduced in the accompanying notebook at Tab 68]

13

Rugunda Explains Government Line on ICC, New Vision/AllAfrica.com (11 October 2006)
[reproduced in the accompanying notebook at Tab 64]; LRA's Otti Vows to Kill ICC Captors, The
Monitor/AllAfrica.com (13 October 2006) [reproduced in the accompanying notebook at 64]; Rebel
Leader Vows War over Indictments, New Vision/AllAfrica.com (25 May 2007) [reproduced in the
accompanying notebook at Tab 67]; Museveni Wants LRA Warrants - For Now, supra note 13,
[reproduced in the accompanying notebook at Tab 68]; Gov't Rules Out Blanket Amnesty for LRA,
Institute for War & Peace Reporting/AllAfrica.com (8 October 2007) [reproduced in the accompanying
notebook at Tab 69]

14

15

International Criminal Court Press Release, Prosecutor receives referral of the situation in the
Democratic Republic of Congo, 19 April 2004, ICC-OTP-20040419-50-En [reproduced in the
accompanying notebook at Tab 35]

16

International Criminal Court Press Release, Prosecutor receives referral concerning Central African
Republic, 7 January 2005, ICC-OTP-20050107-86-En [reproduced in the accompanying notebook at Tab
36]

7

respectively. Additionally, the United Nations Security Council referred the situation in Darfur,
Sudan, in March 2005.17
Finally, the Ivory Coast made the first-ever non-State Party provisional declaration to the
ICC in February 2005.18 Ivory Coast signed the Rome Statute soon after it was opened for
signature in 1998 but has never subsequently ratified, accepted, approved, or acceded to the
Statute.19

b.

The Basic Referral Procedure

The Rome Statute outlines a basic procedure for a State to refer a situation to the
Prosecutor of the ICC. The Statute makes clear that only a State Party may refer a situation.20 A
State Party is one that signed the Rome Statute prior to 31 December 2000 and has subsequently
ratified, accepted, or approved the Statute, or one that has otherwise acceded to the Statute since
31 December 2000.21 By definition, a State Party “accepts the jurisdiction of the Court with
respect to the crimes referred to in article 5,”22 namely genocide, war crimes, crimes against
humanity, or aggression.23 A State Party may thus “refer to the Prosecutor a situation in which

17

United Nations Security Council Press Release, Security Council Refers Situation in Darfur, Sudan, to
Prosecutor of International Criminal Court, 31 March 2005, SC/8351 [reproduced in the accompanying
notebook at Tab 38]

18

International Criminal Court Press Release, Registrar confirms that the Republic of Côte d’Ivoire has
accepted the jurisdiction of the Court, 15 February 2005, ICC-20050215-91-En [reproduced in the
accompanying notebook at Tab 37]

19

Id.

20

ICC Statute, supra note 1, arts. 13(a) and 14 [reproduced in the accompanying notebook at Tab 1]

21

Id., art. 125

22

Id., art 12(1)

23

Id., art. 5(1)

8

one or more crimes within the jurisdiction of the Court appear to have been committed,”24 in
writing,25 so that the Prosecutor may subsequently investigate the situation and charge specific
individuals with those crimes. The Court may then exercise its jurisdiction specifically over that
situation.26 The referral procedure therefore has three steps: 1) a State becomes a Party to the
Rome Statute and accepts the Court’s general jurisdiction over the enumerated crimes; 2) a State
refers a specific situation to the Court and “triggers” the Court’s jurisdiction; and 3) the Court
exercises its jurisdiction.
The Rome Statute provides a number of options for delay, deferral, and termination of an
investigation or prosecution once a referral has been made. The United Nations Security Council
can delay or suspend an investigation or prosecution indefinitely under Article 16.27 Articles 17
through 19 establish a broad platform for determining admissibility and jurisdiction for a given
case. Not only may an interested State28 or an accused29 challenge admissibility or jurisdiction
based on various criteria, but the Court itself may also voluntarily question the admissibility of a
case30 and must “satisfy itself that it has jurisdiction in any case brought before it.”31 The

24

Id., art. 14

25

Rules of Procedure and Evidence of the International Criminal Court, Rule 45, ICC-ASP/1/3
[hereinafter ICC Rules], available at http://www.icccpi.int/library/about/officialjournal/Rules_of_procedure_and_Evidence_English.pdf [reproduced in the
accompanying notebook at Tab 2]
26

ICC Statute, supra note 1, art. 13[reproduced in the accompanying notebook at Tab 1]

27

Id., art. 16

28

Id., arts. 18 and 19, generally

29

Id., art. 19, generally

30

Id., art 19(1)

31

ICC Statute, supra note 1, art. 19(1) [reproduced in the accompanying notebook at Tab 1].
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Prosecutor may defer an investigation in light of admissibility issues under these articles. Article
53 provides that the Prosecutor may decline to prosecute following an investigation and that he
may reconsider a decision to investigate or prosecute a case.32 He also may amend or withdraw
charges against an individual pursuant to Article 61.33 The Statute generally shows flexibility in
favor of States in light of “exceptional circumstances,”34 “change of circumstances,”35 and “new
facts or information.”36 Each of these options represents a procedural check on the power of the
Court that could conceivably be leveraged by any interested and determined party. 37
States not party to the ICC may not make referrals.38 Rather, those states may make ad
hoc declarations accepting the ICC’s jurisdiction over the Rome Statute’s crimes without
actually becoming a State Party,39 thereby allowing the Prosecutor to initiate investigations at his

32

Id., art. 53

33

Id., art. 61

34

Id., art. 19(4)

35

Id., art. 18(7) (“Change of circumstances” can also work against a State; see art. 18(3))

36

Id., art. 53(4)

37

On the other hand, one ICC analyst has noted that the Pre-Trial Chamber has no power to restrain the
Prosecutor “once the jurisdictional and admissibility requirements have been satisfied” – the Prosecutor’s
discretion is his only control at that point. “Although there are institutional checks on the power of the
Prosecutor…bureaucratic realities provide no procedural boundaries to check – or assist – his decision to
prosecute when the ‘interestes of justice’ are in question.” J. Alex Little, Balancing Accountability and
Victim Autonomy at the International Criminal Court, 38 GEO. J. INT'L L. 363, 379 [reproduced in the
accompanying notebook at Tab 53]
38

Sharon Williams, ‘Article 13: Exercise of jurisdiction,’ ¶ 15, in Otto Triffterer, ed., Commentary on the
Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court: Observers’ Notes, Article by Article, Baden-Baden:
Nomos Verlagsgesellschaft, 1999 [reproduced in the accompanying notebook at Tab 44]
39

ICC Statute, supra note 1, art. 12(3) [reproduced in the accompanying notebook at Tab 1]
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discretion using his Article 15 proprio motu privileges.40 Although the drafters of the Statute
may have intended the Court to interpret these declarations “in the sense of ‘situation in
question,’”41 they arguably did not mean for the Court to treat an acceptance of such declarations
as analogous to a State Party referral.42 “To treat a declaration under Article 12(3) in the same
way as a referral would grant third states a privilege that was reserved to states parties to the
Statute. Article 14 limits the possibility of referrals expressly to states parties, and the article's
drafting history confirms that this limitation was intended.”43 Otherwise, non-States Parties
could take advantage of the powers and resources of the ICC “without sharing the burdens and
obligations assumed by states parties, such as budgetary contributions and duties of
cooperation.”44 Consequently, this memo does not directly address the issues involved in a nonState Party declaration.
This memo also does not specifically address issues concerning Security Council
referrals to the ICC. Article 16 of the Rome Statute provides the Security Council with the
power to indefinitely defer the investigation or prosecution of any case;45 therefore, the question

Id., arts. 12(2) and 15; Carsten Stahn, Mohamed M. El Zeidy, and Hecto Olasolo, Developments at the
International Criminal Court: The International Criminal Court’s ad hoc Jurisdiction Revisited, 99 AM.
J. INT'L L. 421, 426 [reproduced in the accompanying notebook at Tab 49]
40

41

Hans-Peter Kaul, ‘Preconditions to the Exercise of Jurisdiction’, p. 611, in Antonio Cassese, Paola
Gaeta, John R.W.D. Jones, eds., The Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court: A Commentary;
Volume 1, New York: Oxford University Press Inc., 2002 [reproduced in the accompanying notebook at
Tab 39]
Stahn, El Zeidy, and Olasolo, supra note 40, at 424 [reproduced in the accompanying notebook at Tab
49]

42

43

Id.

Id., 425; see also Williams, ‘Article 13: Exercise of jurisdiction,’ supra note 38, ¶ 3 [reproduced in the
accompanying notebook at Tab 44] (noting that the ILC similarly believed that restriction of referrals to
States Parties would enhance cooperation and encourage ratification)

44

45

ICC Statute, supra note 1, art. 16 [reproduced in the accompanying notebook at Tab 1]
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of whether the Security Council may withdraw a referral is less compelling. Where relevant,
however, conclusions that relate to Security Council referrals as well as State referrals are noted.

c.

The Self-Referral Phenomenon
The factual background to the withdrawal issue necessarily includes the fact that “self-

referrals” are themselves something of an unexpected phenomenon. As Mahnoush Arsanjani
and W. Michael Reisman, two expert commentators on the ICC, have observed,
Before and during the Rome negotiations, no one -- neither states that were
initially skeptical about the viability of an international criminal court nor states
that supported it -- assumed that governments would want to invite the future
court to investigate and prosecute crimes that had occurred in their territory. To
the contrary, it was assumed that the Court would become involved only in those
states that were unwilling or refused to prosecute, staged a sham prosecution of
their governmental cronies, or were simply unable to prosecute. There is no
indication that the drafters ever contemplated that the Statute would include
voluntary state referrals to the Court of difficult cases arising in their own
territory. By voluntary referral we refer to situations in which the sole basis for
satisfying the Court's admissibility test is the referral -- whether effected formally
or implicitly -- by the state in which a crime or the situation subject to
investigation has taken place.46
In other words, the expectation was that States Parties would only refer situations in other States.
The current Prosecutor altered this expectation upon accepting his position at the Court.
The Prosecutor issued a policy paper in September 2003 in which he outlined some principles
and goals of the Office of the Prosecutor (OTP), as well as some basic organizational issues –
sort of a “State of the OTP” address.47 He made two particularly noteworthy remarks in this

46

Arsanjani and Reisman, supra note 4, at 386-387 [reproduced in the accompanying notebook at Tab 56]

Paper on some policy issues before the Office of the Prosecutor, September 2003, available at
http://www.icc-cpi.int/library/organs/otp/030905_Policy_Paper.pdf [hereinafter “OTP Policy Paper”]
[reproduced in the accompanying notebook at Tab 30]
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paper, for the purposes of this discussion. First, he declared his intention for the OTP to
“function with a two-tiered approach to combat impunity,” in which his office would pursue
those “who bear most responsibility for the crimes” while encouraging “national prosecutions,
where possible, for the lower-ranking perpetrators.”48 Second, in keeping with a “two-tiered
approach,” he stated that, rather than working only on potentially adversarial situations where a
State is unwilling or unable genuinely to investigate or prosecute,
there is no impediment to the admissibility of a case before the Court where no
State has initiated any investigation. There may be cases where inaction by States
is the appropriate course of action. For example, the Court and a territorial State
incapacitated by mass crimes may agree that a consensual division of labour is the
most logical and effective approach.49
The Prosecutor integrated the ideals of complementarity, effective prosecution, and “duty of
every State to exercise its criminal jurisdiction over those responsible for international crimes”
embodied in the Rome Statute.50 He essentially declared his intention to work with States
Parties, and not against them.
The Prosecutor’s policy declaration had three tangible effects. First, the policy paper
itself highlighted the Prosecutor’s dynamic and innovative approach to applying and interpreting
the Rome Statute, especially in light of the ambiguities built into the Statute51 and the lack of

48

Id., p. 3

49

Id., p. 5

50

ICC Statute, supra note 1, preamble [reproduced in the accompanying notebook at Tab 1]

51

A surprising number of Rome Statute article and draft history discussions conclude with some version
of the statement that the drafters “failed to solve the problem and decided to leave it for the Court to
resolve.” Stahn, El Zeidy, and Olasolo, supra note 40, at 424 (discussing the Court’s temporal
jurisdiction) [reproduced in the accompanying notebook at Tab 49] See also infra note 52 (discussing
waiver of complementarity and self-referrals, “…it seems that this issue was left to the Court’s
interpretation.”); Little, supra note 37, at 365 [reproduced in the accompanying notebook at Tab 53]
(“…the Rome Statute had left open the question of whether and when the Court should defer to domestic
amnesties for such perpetrators.”) There are numerous other examples, especially in the draft history
materials. Little’s explanation for this is that “the lack of guidance was intended, at least in part, to
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adjudicative history at the ICC to date. The drafters of the Rome Statute apparently left the
possibility of self-referral or waiver of complementarity to the Court’s interpretation, 52 and the
Prosecutor gave the question some definition. Arsanjani and Reisman characterize this as “the
law-in-action of the International Criminal Court.”53
Second, the Prosecutor has in fact worked closely with States Parties, and he succeeded
in obtaining the first three referrals to the ICC as self-referrals. He has noted that he worked
especially with both Uganda and Congo to encourage those States to self-refer their situations.54
This seemingly cooperative achievement has a potential dark side, however. This cooperation
amounts to something of a hybrid between the power of self-referral and the Prosecutor’s
proprio motu powers under Article 15 of the Rome Statute.55 As such, it could be seen as a
dodge by the Prosecutor of the authorization he is required to obtain from the pre-Trial Chamber
to start an investigation proprio motu under Article 1556 and an abuse of the automatic
investigation mandated by a State Party referral under Article 53.57 The Prosecutor must

provide the Prosecutor with a wide range of options when faced with admittedly new circumstances.”
Little, supra note 37, at 379 [reproduced in the accompanying notebook at Tab 53]
Mohamed M. El Zeidy, The Ugandan Government Triggers the First Test of the Complementarity
Principle: An Assessment of the First State’s Party Referral to the ICC, INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL LAW
REVIEW 5: 83-119, 2005, at 100 [reproduced in the accompanying notebook at Tab 58]
52

53

Arsanjani and Reisman, supra note 4, generally [reproduced in the accompanying notebook at Tab 56]

54

Public remarks by ICC Chief Prosecutor Luis Moreno-Ocampo at Case Western Reserve University
School of Law, 16 October 2007
55

ICC Statute, supra note 1, art. 15 [reproduced in the accompanying notebook at Tab 1]

56

Id., art. 15(3)

Id., art. 53(1); Paola Gaeta, Is the Practice of ‘Self-Referrals’ a Sound Start for the ICC?, ICJ 2.4 (949)
(discussing in greater depth this and other “possible pitfalls” of self-referrals and the Prosecutor’s policy)
[reproduced in the accompanying notebook at Tab 59]
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therefore take care that this process of encouraged self-referral occurs transparently and by-thebook.
Third, however, the self-referral phenomenon has itself generated the current confusion
over whether a State Party can withdraw a referral. Theoretically, as the drafters expected, a
State Party referring a situation in another State would have little desire to withdraw a referral;
any situation grave enough to warrant a referral would be unlikely to dissipate enough to cause
the referring State to change its mind.58 Alternatively, the drafters feared that the ICC would
receive only throwaway referrals, because “states might abuse such an option by trying to send
frivolous or politically motivated referrals with regard to situations in the territory of a political
adversary.”59 To address such concerns, the drafters built a screening process into the Rome
Statute for the Prosecutor and a notification process for the referred State.60 This notification
process may actually provide the lone avenue for withdrawal for a self-referring State (discussed
below at Section II(d)(ii)(1)).
Instead, with the apparent proliferation of self-referrals, the ICC must deal with the
variety of reasons that a State may seek to withdraw its referral. “Considering the pressure for
resolving disputes through negotiation and the recognition that some of these disputes are not
susceptible to military solutions, is it not likely that some states that have made voluntary
referrals may later agree, as part of the negotiating process with their adversaries, to withdraw
their referral to the ICC? Grounds for withdrawal… could be that the state has decided to use its
58

Philippe Kirsch, QC and Darryl Robinson, “Referral by State Parties”, pp. 624-625, in Cassese, Gaeta,
and Jones, eds., supra note 41 [reproduced in the accompanying notebook at Tab 40]

Arsanjani and Reisman, supra note 4, n. 9 [reproduced in the accompanying notebook at Tab 56], citing
Kirsch and Robinson, “Referral by State Parties”, supra note 58, [reproduced in the accompanying
notebook at Tab 40]

59

60

Id.; ICC Statute, supra note 1, arts. 53 and 18(1) [reproduced in the accompanying notebook at Tab 1]
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national judicial system to deal with crimes…”61 More drastically, a newly elected government,
a government that overthrows the previous one, or a brand new government taking power in the
wake of a State’s fracturing or State succession would be especially likely to try to withdraw a
referral from the ICC.
Whatever the cause, the issue of withdrawal is now unavoidable, and the evolution of the
ICC process must be considered as part of the backdrop to the discussion.

III. Legal Discussion
a.

The Rome Statute does not provide for withdrawal of a State Party referral

The Rome Statute does not provide for withdrawal of a State Party referral anywhere,
either on its face or under more nuanced scrutiny. The glaring absence of such a provision taken
together with the abundance of other procedural safeguards available to both the State and the
Prosecutor strengthens the conclusion that the Statute simply does not allow a referral to be
withdrawn. Rather, the Statute as a whole conveys the impression that once a referral has been
made and the Court has exercised its jurisdiction, control and power over the referral lies entirely
in the hands of the Court.
The Statute itself makes reference to “withdrawal” in only four of its one hundred and
twenty-eight articles, and only three of these references directly concern States Parties. Article
127 deals exclusively with withdrawal from the Rome Statute as a whole and provides the best
context for the Statute’s treatment of the concept of “withdrawal”. Article 127 states in full:
1. A State Party may, by written notification addressed to the Secretary-General
of the United Nations, withdraw from this Statute. The withdrawal shall take
effect one year after the date of receipt of the notification, unless the notification
specifies a later date.
61

Arsanjani and Reisman, supra note 4, at 397 [reproduced in the accompanying notebook at Tab 56]
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2. A State shall not be discharged, by reason of its withdrawal, from the
obligations arising from this Statute while it was a Party to the Statute, including
any financial obligations which may have accrued. Its withdrawal shall not affect
any cooperation with the Court in connection with criminal investigations and
proceedings in relation to which the withdrawing State had a duty to cooperate
and which were commenced prior to the date on which the withdrawal became
effective, nor shall it prejudice in any way the continued consideration of any
matter which was already under consideration by the Court prior to the date on
which the withdrawal became effective.
Taken as a whole, Article 127 upholds the sovereign right of a State to withdraw from a treaty,
while binding the withdrawing State to its existing obligations under the ICC. The one-year
notice allows the Court ample time to take under consideration any relevant matter and to thwart
a State Party seeking to evade responsibility for crimes not yet connected “with criminal
investigations and proceedings” by withdrawing.
The mere existence of the general withdrawal clause in Article 127 is itself evidence that
the Statute does not explicitly or implicitly permit withdrawal of a specific referral. As noted in
Section II(b), the referral process comprises three steps. The provision for withdrawal from the
first step (becoming a State Party) but not the others (specifically, making a referral) suggests, if
not the negative implication of deliberate omission,62 then at least the lack of consideration of the
capability to withdraw a referral under the Statute. Taken together with the many other options
for delay, deferral, and termination of a case, this omission or lack of consideration is
conspicuous.

Expressio unius est exclusio alterius, “to express or include one thing implies the exclusion of the other,
or of the alternative.” Black’s Law Dictionary (8th ed. 2004). This canon of construction is “at best a
description, after the fact, of what the court has discovered from context.” Id., quoting Reed Dickerson,
The Interpretation and Application of Statutes 234- 35 (1975). The Rome Statute provides plenty of
context with which to examine this idea.
62
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Article 121 briefly addresses withdrawal from the treaty “with immediate effect” as a
legitimate response by a State Party to an amendment to the Rome Statute, but conditions the
withdrawal on compliance with Article 127(2).63 This article therefore similarly affirms a State’s
sovereign right not to be bound involuntarily to new treaty obligations while holding that State
accountable for those obligations already in place. Of course, Article 121 does not have any
effect until 2009 at the earliest.64
Article 124 allows a State Party to withdraw a declaration limiting its recognition of the
jurisdiction of the ICC “at any time;”65 in other words, the Statute does not restrict a State Party
from entering further into the auspices of the Court, as opposed to withdrawing from it. Finally,
Article 61 establishes the Prosecutor’s power to withdraw charges in certain circumstances and
does not relate to States Parties actions.
In order to more fully consider the concept of withdrawal of a referral with respect to the
Statute, it is helpful to more clearly define the concept. A referral is the submission by a State
Party of a situation to the Prosecutor,66 for the Court to then exercise its jurisdiction over specific
crimes in that situation.67 Several ICC experts have described a self-referral more specifically as
a State Party’s voluntary decision to relinquish its jurisdiction over a situation.68 Logically, then,

63

ICC Statute, supra note 1, art. 121(6) [reproduced in the accompanying notebook at Tab 1]
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Id., art. 121(1) (amendments cannot even be proposed until July 1, 2009)
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Id., art. 124
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Id., art. 14(1)
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Id., art. 13(a)

Arsanjani and Reisman, supra note 4, at 388 [reproduced in the accompanying notebook at Tab 56]; El
Zeidy, supra note 52, at 100, 102, and 104 [reproduced in the accompanying notebook at Tab 58];
Akhavan, supra note 10, 404, 413-416, 418 [reproduced in the accompanying notebook at Tab 60]. All
four experts cite the 1995 Report of the Ad Hoc Committee on the Establishment of an International
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a withdrawal of a referral is the unilateral removal or retraction of a situation from the Court’s
jurisdiction, assuming the Court has taken the steps to exercise its jurisdiction.69
In this light, the Rome Statute is crystal clear. Article 19(1) states that “the Court shall
satisfy itself that it has jurisdiction in any case brought before it.” The notion of competence de
la competence, a court’s power to determine its own jurisdiction, is so well settled in
international law that “the requirement in this paragraph that the Court satisfy itself in any case
before it that it has jurisdiction was not strictly necessary.”70 A State may challenge the
jurisdiction or the admissibility of a case under Rule 19 once the Court has taken jurisdiction,71
but a State Party can not unilaterally supersede the authority of the Court to deny jurisdiction.

b.

The draft history of the Rome Statute contains no discussion of withdrawal of a
State Party referral

Criminal Court as the origin of the “relinquish” language (discussed further infra at Section III(b)), in the
context of discussing the legitimacy of self-referrals. Report of the Ad Hoc Committee on the
Establishment of an International Criminal Court, UN GAOR, 50th Sess., Supp. No. 22, ¶ 47, UN Doc.
A/50/22 (1995) [reproduced in the accompanying notebook at Tab 32]. Arsanjani and Reisman contend
that a case deriving from a self-referral is inadmissible before the ICC, while El Zeidy and Akhavan
(writing at about the same time and using very similar language) seem to agree that self-referrals are
legitimate and admissible. Arsanjani and Reisman, supra note 4, at 386-391; El Zeidy, supra note 52, at
104 (“There is no logic in rejecting a State’s attempt to relinquish its jurisdiction in favor of the Court
from the outset”); Akhavan, supra note 10, at 415 (“There is no basis, in law or policy, for the assertion
that states cannot voluntarily relinquish jurisdiction in favor of the ICC”). The current Chief Prosecutor
obviously takes the latter view.
69

See section II(d)(ii)(1) for discussion of whether and when the Court’s jurisdiction has been exercised.
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Christopher K. Hall, ‘Article 19: Challenges to the jurisdiction of the Court or the admissibility of a
case,’ ¶ 2, in Triffterer, ed., supra note 38 (citing the case of Prosecutor v. Tadić from the International
Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia) [reproduced in the accompanying notebook at Tab 46]

ICC Statute, supra note 1, arts. 19(2), (4), (5), and (7) [reproduced in the accompanying notebook at
Tab 1]
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The draft history of the Rome Statute, like the Statute itself, contains virtually no
discussion of the possibility of withdrawal of a State Party referral. This fact is unsurprising,
given that this issue arose out of the self-referral phenomenon, which was itself barely
considered by the drafters. However, the absence of discussion of withdrawal, the minimal
consideration of self-referral, the drafters’ heavy focus on issues of complementarity and
jurisdiction, and the language of the draft statute itself, taken as a whole, convey the strong
impression that the drafters did not intend to provide a State with the power to unilaterally
withdraw a referral from the Court and did intend to bind States to their obligations under the
Statute.
As discussed above in Section II(c), the drafters of the Rome Statute apparently never
“contemplated that the Statute would include voluntary state referrals to the Court of difficult
cases arising in their own territory.”72 On the contrary, the drafters envisioned a “typically
interstate trigger mechanism”73 like those in place at other human rights bodies, and the debate
over State referrals therefore centered primarily on which States could refer, and whether States
should refer situations or individual cases.74 Secondary to these concerns was the drafters’ fear
of abuse of the process by States for “frivolous or vexatious purposes.”75
The drafters also believed that States would submit referrals only rarely anyway. As one
observer has pointed out, the interstate complaint mechanism “is not particularly suitable for the
72

Arsanjani and Reisman, supra note 4, at 386-387 [reproduced in the accompanying notebook at Tab 56]

Antonio Marchesi, ‘Article 14: Referral of a situation by a State Party’, ¶ 6, in Triffterer, ed., supra
note 38 [reproduced in the accompanying notebook at Tab 45]

73

Kirsch and Robinson, “Referral by State Parties”, supra note 58, generally [reproduced in the
accompanying notebook at Tab 40]; Williams, ‘Article 13: Exercise of jurisdiction,’ supra note 38, ¶ 10
[reproduced in the accompanying notebook at Tab 44]
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Id., p. 622; see also Arsanjani and Reisman, supra note 4, n. 9, as cited earlier [reproduced in the
accompanying notebook at Tab 56]
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purpose of individual criminal justice,” because “state complaints are, typically, aimed at
initiating proceedings before the International Court of Justice or an arbitral tribunal entrusted
with the task of settling a dispute between States and possibly ascertaining an internationally
wrongful act.”76 Additionally, a number of drafters and ICC experts have cited the general
failure of States to use the interstate complaint procedures available at various other human
rights bodies as evidence that States would be reluctant to initiate “independent international
inquiries into human rights violations” by other States at the fledgling ICC.77 Consequently, it
was expected that the Court would have to rely primarily on Security Council referrals (at least at
first)78 and the Prosecutor’s independent powers79 in order to actually exercise the Court’s
jurisdiction and prosecute individual cases.

76

Marchesi, supra note 73, ¶ 6 [reproduced in the accompanying notebook at Tab 45]

Id. (“Certain precedents, including the failure of the interstate complaint procedure provided for by the
ICCPR, indicate that Governments are not inclined to set off independent international inquiries into
human rights violations by other Governments…”); Gaeta, supra note 57, [reproduced in the
accompanying notebook at Tab 59] (“In practice, however, states are likely to take advantage of this
opportunity rarely, as the small number of interstate complaints within the framework of human rights
treaties clearly shows.”); Philippe Kirsch, QC and Darryl Robinson, ‘Initiation of Proceedings by the
Prosecutor,’ p. 662-663 and n. 28, in Cassese, Gaeta, and Jones, eds., supra note 41 [reproduced in the
accompanying notebook at Tab 41] (“…the experience under various human rights conventions was a
persuasive indication that reliance on States to refer situations would not be ideal.” They further note that
no inter-state human rights complaints had, to date, been brought either under the ICCPR or to the InterAmerican Court of Human Rights under the American Convention on Human Rights, and that only seven
such cases had been brought before the European Commission on Human Rights, of which only one came
before the European Court.) Also, as the website for the Office of the United Nations High
Commissioner for Human Rights helpfully states, “Several of the Human Rights Treaties contain
provisions to allow for State parties to complain to the relevant treaty body about alleged violations of the
treaty by another State party. Note: these procedures have never been used.” See ‘Human Rights Bodies
– Complaints Procedures: Inter-State Complaints,’ available at
http://www.ohchr.org/english/bodies/petitions/index.htm.
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Sharon Williams, ‘Article 12: Preconditions to the exercise of jurisdiction,’ ¶ 3, in Triffterer, ed., supra
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However, a lone example of the consideration of self-referral exists in the draft history,
disguised as a question of “waiver of complementarity.” Mohamed M. El Zeidy succinctly
describes this example in his discussion of the Ugandan self-referral:
The question of waiver first arose during the discussions of the 1995 Adhoc
Committee and seemed to be controversial. While it has been proposed that the
Statute should permit a situation where a State might ‘voluntarily decide to
relinquish its jurisdiction in favour’ of the ICC, the proposal did not gain support
from some delegations. Some of them believed that such a proposal would be
inconsistent with the principle of complementarity as the ICC ‘should in no way
undermine the effectiveness of national justice systems and should only be resorted
to in exceptional cases.’ A footnote was inserted to that effect in subsequent drafts
and remained until the Rome Conference. It was not discussed however, during the
Conference as many delegations thought that the issue would be better dealt with in
the Rules of Procedure and Evidence. The Rules, however, were silent regarding
this question and it seems that this issue was left to the Court’s interpretation.80
At this point, of course, the Prosecutor has encouraged, and the Court has apparently accepted,
self-referrals as a means of triggering the Court’s jurisdiction. Given the low profile of this note
over the years, the drafters never actually considered the additional implications of such a
concept – such as withdrawal.
The drafters were also preoccupied with the definition of jurisdiction in two important
respects, for the purposes of this discussion. First, Sharon A. Williams’ analyses of the draft
history of Articles 12 and 13 demonstrates that the drafters very carefully constructed the
Kirsch and Robinson, ‘Initiation of Proceedings by the Prosecutor,’ supra note 77, p. 663 [reproduced
in the accompanying notebook at Tab 41]; Marchesi, supra note 73, ¶ 5 [reproduced in the accompanying
notebook at Tab 45]
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El Zeidy, supra note 52, p. 100 [reproduced in the accompanying notebook at Tab 58] He cites, in part,
the Report of the Ad Hoc Committee on the Establishment of an International Criminal Court, supra note
68, ¶ 47 [reproduced in the accompanying notebook at Tab 32]; the Draft Statute for the International
Criminal Court and Draft Final Act of the United Nations Diplomatic Conference of Plenipotentiaries on
the Establishment of an International Criminal Court, art. 15, p. 48 n. 38, 14 April 1998,
A/CONF.183/2/Add.1 [reproduced in the accompanying notebook at Tab 33] [hereinafter 1998 Draft
Statute]; and John T. Holmes, 'The Principle of Complementarity', p. 78, in Roy S. Lee, ed., The
International Criminal Court: The Making of the Rome Statute; Issues, Negotiations, Results, Boston:
Kluwer Law International, 1999 [reproduced in the accompanying notebook at Tab 42]
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jurisdictional regime for these two articles. The resulting articles were a compromise, especially
with regard to Article 12, that backed away from giving the Court universal or inherent
jurisdiction and instead relied very heavily on State Party consent and referral for the Court to
function.81 The sudden and unilateral withdrawal of jurisdiction from the Court would therefore
interfere with the functioning of the Court, at best, and destroy the Court’s functioning
altogether, at worst. Such withdrawal cannot be compatible with the jurisdictional structure
created in these articles.
Second, the draft history shows that the drafters strongly supported the inclusion of the
concept of competence de la competence in Article 19. This concept is so well established as to
be almost taken for granted by the Court, as discussed in Section III(a). John T. Holmes has
noted that “the principle that the Court must always satisfy itself as to its jurisdiction was widely
supported. The language eventually agreed upon made clear that this duty existed throughout all
stages of the proceedings.”82 The drafters therefore always intended for the Court to control
decisions regarding a case over which it had exercised jurisdiction. The idea that a State could
unilaterally withdraw jurisdiction from the Court directly contradicts the drafters’ intentions and
the eventual Rome Statute’s language.
Finally, the 1998 Draft Act, the penultimate version of the Rome Statute, provides
additional insight into the drafters’ thinking. Like the final Statute, the 1998 Draft Statute
contains no mention of withdrawal of a referral, only withdrawal in unrelated contexts or

See Williams, ‘Article 12: Preconditions to the exercise of jurisdiction,’ supra note 78, generally
[reproduced in the accompanying notebook at Tab 43] and Williams, ‘Article 13: Exercise of
jurisdiction,’ supra note 38, generally [reproduced in the accompanying notebook at Tab 44]
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regarding the statute as a whole.83 There is one semi-exception, however. Article 9 of the Draft
Statute (which would eventually become Article 12(3) of the Rome Statute) contains several
options for “Acceptance of the jurisdiction of the Court.”84 Option 2 of this draft article would
allow a State to accept the jurisdiction of the Court after the State becomes a Party “at a later
time, by declaration lodged with the Registrar,”85 rather than automatically as a condition to
becoming a State Party (like the eventual Rome Statute Article 12(3)). Option 2 further provides
that
A declaration may be made for a specified period, in which case it may not be
withdrawn before the end of that period, or for an unspecified period, in which
case it may be withdrawn only upon giving a six month’s notice of withdrawal to
the Registrar. Withdrawal does not affect proceedings already commenced under
this Statute.86

Although the drafters ultimately rejected this option in favor of automatic consent to the Court’s
general jurisdiction,87 its inclusion reveals the drafters’ specific intention to bind States Parties to
the obligations incurred by a State’s consent to jurisdiction, even when allowing a State
flexibility in its consent. This translates directly to the notion that a State cannot rescind a
decision to relinquish jurisdiction over a situation to the Court, as would happen in the case of
withdrawal of a referral.

See for example the 1998 Draft Statute, supra note 80, arts. 58, 59, 61, 87, 90, 109, 110, and 115
[reproduced in the accompanying notebook at Tab 33]
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Id., art. 9, p. 32-33
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Id., art. 9, Option 2 ¶ 1(b), p. 33
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Id., ¶ 3
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ICC Statute, supra note 1, art. 12(3) [reproduced in the accompanying notebook at Tab 1]
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c.

Beyond the Rome Statute – comparison with other international human rights
bodies

The ICC has yet to produce any real case law with which to analyze this issue concerning
the Rome Statute. It seems appropriate, therefore, to look to the other international human rights
supervisory and adjudicative bodies for comparison and analysis. It is worth noting that the ICC
is not itself a comprehensive human rights court or treaty; rather, the Court is a criminal court
with jurisdiction over those abuses of human rights that constitute “the most serious crimes of
concern to the international community as a whole.”88 The Court is therefore technically a
limited human rights body. Article 21 of the Rome Statute specifically requires the Court to
apply, in addition to the Statute and rules of the Court itself,89 “applicable treaties and the
principles and rules of international law,”90 and that “the application and interpretation of law
pursuant to this article must be consistent with internationally recognized human rights.”91 The
Court will no doubt look to the other international criminal tribunals as it prosecutes specific
crimes and addresses issues of criminal procedure. On the other hand, the international human
rights bodies are especially relevant with regard to broader issues of human rights principle and
procedure.

i.

The statutes of the major human rights bodies collectively confirm the
principle of competence de la competence and reject unilateral withdrawal of
jurisdiction

88

Id., art. 5(1)

89

Id., art. 21(1)(a)

90

Id., art. 21(1)(b)

91

Id., art. 21(3)
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A simple comparison between the Rome Statute and the statutory basis of every other
human rights body shows that these statutes uniformly uphold the principle of competence de la
competence and reject unilateral withdrawal from the jurisdiction of that body, where and when
they speak to these issues. Two types of relevant international human rights supervisory bodies
currently exist. First, there are the four international human rights courts: the International Court
of Justice (ICJ),92 the Inter-American Court of Human Rights (IACHR), the European Court of
Human Rights (ECHR), and the African Court on Human and Peoples’ Rights (ACHPR).93
Second, five of the core international human rights treaties of the United Nations have
established supervisory, quasi-adjudicative bodies that hear cases or complaints. The
International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR) has established the Human Rights
Committee to monitor implementation of the Covenant;94 additionally, a supervisory Committee
has been established for each of the International Convention on the Protection of the Rights of
All Migrant Workers and Members of Their Families (CMW); the International Convention on
the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination (CERD); the Convention on the
The ICJ is not a human rights court per se; rather, the ICJ is a human rights court incidentally as the
“principal judicial organ of the United Nations”, whose purposes include “promoting and encouraging
human rights.” U.N Charter, Arts. 92 and 1(3)
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The African court is “not yet functioning”, due to its relatively recent establishment; however, its
statute is in place. See generally the homepage for the African Court on Human and People’s Rights at
http://www.aict-ctia.org/courts_conti/achpr/achpr_home.html (last accessed on 2 November 2007); the
African (Banjul) Charter on Human and Peoples' Rights, Adopted 27 June 1981, OAU Doc.
CAB/LEG/67/3 rev. 5, 21 I.L.M 58 (1982), entered into force 21 October 1986 [reproduced in the
accompanying notebook at Tab 3]; and the Protocol to the African Charter on Human and Peoples' Rights
on the Establishment of an African Court on Human and Peoples' Rights adopted in Ouagadougou,
Burkina Faso, June 10, 1998, entered into force January 25, 2004, available at http://www.africaunion.org/Official_documents/Treaties_%20Conventions_%20Protocols/africancourt-humanrights.pdf
[hereinafter Protocol to the African Charter] [reproduced in the accompanying notebook at Tab 12]
94

See the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, Part IV, adopted 16 December 1966,
entered into force 23 March 1976, 999 UNTS 171, [hereinafter ICCPR] [reproduced in the accompanying
notebook at Tab 9] and the Optional Protocol to the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights,
generally, adopted 16 December 1966, entered into force 23 March 1976, 999 UNTS 302, [hereinafter
ICCPR Optional Protocol] [reproduced in the accompanying notebook at Tab 11]
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Elimination of Discrimination against Women (CEDAW); and the Convention Against Torture
and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment (CAT).95
Every one of the statutes or treaties that serves as the foundation of these nine human
rights bodies and allows denunciation or withdrawal from the treaty, or withdrawal from a
conditional acceptance of the court’s or committee’s jurisdiction to hear cases or complaints,
contains a stipulation that such withdrawal or denunciation shall not release the State from
obligations arising, acts occurring, and/or cases or complaints commencing while that State was
still party to the treaty or statute.96 Every treaty or statute providing for denunciation requires at
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See, respectively: the International Convention on the Protection of the Rights of All Migrant Workers
and Members of Their Families, generally, G.A. Res. 45/158, 45 U.N. GAOR Supp. No. 49A at 262,
U.N. Doc. A/45/49 (1990) (entered into force July 1, 2003), [hereinafter ICPMW] [reproduced in the
accompanying notebook at Tab 8]; the International Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of
Racial Discrimination, generally, adopted 21 December 1965, entered into force, 4 January 1969. 660
U.N.T.S. 195, 5 ILM (1966) 352, [hereinafter ICERD] [reproduced in the accompanying notebook at Tab
7]; the Optional Protocol to the Convention on the Elimination of Discrimination against Women,
generally, March 12, 1999, 38 ILM 763 (1999), [hereinafter CEDAW Optional Protocol] [reproduced in
the accompanying notebook at Tab 10]; and the Convention Against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or
Degrading Treatment or Punishment, generally, adopted and opened for signature, ratification and
accession on 10 December 1984 by GA Res. 39/46, 39 UN GAOR, Supp. No. 51, UN Doc. A/39/51, at
197 (1984), entered into force 26 June 1987. 1465 U.N.T.S. 85; 23 ILM (1985) 535, [hereinafter CAT]
[reproduced in the accompanying notebook at Tab 5]. The remaining two “core international human
rights treaties,” the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights and the Convention
on the Rights of the Child, also have supervisory Committees, but these treaty bodies do not hear cases or
complaints. See generally ‘Human Rights Treaty Bodies: Monitoring the core international human rights
treaties,’ at the website of the Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights,
available at http://www.ohchr.org/english/bodies/treaty/index.htm.

See ICPMW, supra note 95, art. 89(3)(denunciation) and art. 77(8)(conditional acceptance); ICERD,
supra note 95, art. 14(3)(conditional acceptance only, oddly); CEDAW Optional protocol, supra note 95,
art. 19(2)(denunciation only); CAT, supra note 95, art. 31(2)(denunciation) and art. 21(2)(conditional
withdrawal); ICCPR, supra note 94, art. 41(2)(conditional acceptance only; the ICCPR does not allow
denunciation or withdrawal from the Covenant, see Section III(d)(ii)(2)(d) below); American Convention
on Human Rights, art. 78(2)(denunciation), O.A.S. Treaty Series No. 36, 1144 U.N.T.S. 123, entered into
force 18 July 1978, reprinted in Basic Documents Pertaining to Human Rights in the Inter-American
System, OEA/Ser.L.V./II82 doc.6 rev.1 at 25 (1992) [reproduced in the accompanying notebook at Tab
4]; European Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms as amended by
Protocol No. 11 (with Protocol Nos. 1,4,6,7,12 and 13), art. 58(2)(denunciation), signed 4 Nov. 1950,
entered into force 3 Sep. 1953, 213 U.N.T.S. 221 [hereinafter European Convention], [reproduced in the
accompanying notebook at Tab 6]. The International Court of Justice and the African Court do not
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least six months’ notice,97 and four of them require a full year.98 Finally, all four of the human
rights courts stipulate their competence de la competence, such that the court alone decides
disputes or issues of jurisdiction.99
It could be contended, based on this unified overview of the other major human rights
bodies, that the narrow realm of international human rights treaties and courts has developed a
customary international law of procedure, in that such courts must alone decide matters of
jurisdiction, that States remain bound to obligations incurred under such treaties in the event of
withdrawal or denunciation, and such withdrawal or denunciation requires at least six months
notice, where it is permitted at all. The case law of these bodies will bolster this view.

ii.

The case law of the major international human rights judicial bodies

provide for either denunciation or any sort of limited withdrawal, creating the “rebuttable presumption”
under Article 56 of the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties that they are not subject to
denunciation or withdrawal. See the Statute of the International Court of Justice, generally, June 26, 1945
59 Stat. 1055, 1060, 3 Bevans 1153, 1187 [hereinafter ICJ Statute] [reproduced in the accompanying
notebook at Tab 15] the Protocol to the African Charter, supra note 93, generally [reproduced in the
accompanying notebook at Tab 12], and the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, art. 56,
concluded at Vienna 23 May 1969, entered into force 27 January 1980; 58 U.K.T.S (1980), Cmnd 7964;
1154 U.N.T.S. 331 [hereinafter VCLT] [reproduced in the accompanying notebook at Tab 16] (please see
supra note 95 for any additional Tab listings not listed here)
See CEDAW Optional Protocol, supra note 95, art. 19(1), [reproduced in the accompanying notebook
at Tab 10]; European Convention, supra note 96, art. 58(2), [reproduced in the accompanying notebook at
Tab 6]
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See ICPMW, supra note 95, art. 89(2), [reproduced in the accompanying notebook at Tab 8]; ICERD,
supra note 95, art. 21 [reproduced in the accompanying notebook at Tab 7]; CAT, supra note 95, art.
31(1) [reproduced in the accompanying notebook at Tab 5]; and American Convention, supra note 96, art.
78(2) [reproduced in the accompanying notebook at Tab 4]
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See ICJ Statute, supra note 96, art. 36(6) [reproduced in the accompanying notebook at Tab 15];
American Convention, supra note 96, art. 62(1) [reproduced in the accompanying notebook at Tab 4];
European Convention, supra note 96, art. 32(2) [reproduced in the accompanying notebook at Tab 6]; and
Protocol to the African Charter, supra note 93, art. 3(2) [reproduced in the accompanying notebook at
Tab 12]
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The other major international human rights judicial bodies have produced a considerable
amount of directly relevant case law and legal analysis with which to further examine the issue
of withdrawal of a referral. The Inter-American Court of Human Rights in particular has come
out with several outstanding and comprehensive legal rulings that provide excellent context for
consideration of issues of jurisdiction, withdrawal, treaty interpretation, and human rights law.
The Inter-American Court also delivers the sole convincing case in favor of withdrawal of a
referral, at least in very narrow circumstances. These other human rights bodies have generally
given the seemingly narrow issue of withdrawal important depth and definition.

1.

The Inter-American Court of Human Rights has established the limited
possibility for withdrawal of a referral

In one of its earlier cases, the Inter-American Court held that a party may, in fact, legally
and unilaterally withdraw a case from the Court in certain, limited circumstances. In the Cayara
Case (Cayara v. Peru), the Inter-American Commission submitted four joint cases against Peru
to the Court after completing the standard Commission investigative procedure.100 However, the
Commission withdrew the case from the Court shortly thereafter in response to strenuous
protestations from the Peruvian government over alleged procedural errors.101 Significantly, the
Commission did not request permission to withdraw the case; rather, the Commission Chairman
simply declared his decision in a note to the Court Secretariat “for the time being to withdraw the
case from the Court, in order to reconsider it and possibly present it again at some future date,”

Cayara Case, (Preliminary Objections), Judgment of February 3, 1993, ¶ 26, Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. (Ser.
C) No. 14 (1993) [reproduced in the accompanying notebook at Tab 19]

100

101

Id.
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and withdrew it.102 The Secretariat acknowledged the Chairman’s note and, apparently, accepted
the withdrawal.103 The Commission then amended the referral to correct the irregularities and
resubmitted the case to the Court several months later.104
Peru specifically objected to the withdrawal of the case in its preliminary objections,
claiming that the Commission’s action was illegal and the case was “annulled”, due to the fact
that neither the American Convention nor the Court rules “contemplate the possibility of
withdrawing…a case submitted to the jurisdiction of the Court.”105 The Court, however, found
the withdrawal to be perfectly legitimate in light of the objection’s basis in Article 51 of the
American Convention on Human Rights.106 Article 51 addresses, in part, whether a matter has
been “submitted by the Commission or by the state concerned to the Court and its jurisdiction
accepted.”107 After conceding the absence of any statutory or procedural reference to withdrawal
of an application,108 the Court stated that

This does not mean that it is inadmissible. General principles of procedural law
allow the applicant party to request a court not to process its application, provided
the court has not begun to take up the case. As a rule, that stage begins with the
notification of the other party. Furthermore, the foundation of the Court's
jurisdiction, as set forth in Article 61(1) of the Convention, lies in the will of the
Commission or of the States Parties.
102

Id.

103

Id., ¶ 27

104

Id., ¶ 30

Id., ¶ 46. Comically, Peru’s objection to the withdrawal was also based in part on apparent indignation
at the claim that Peru had requested the withdrawal; Peru had actually requested that the case not be
submitted at all. This is not the last example of Peru’s sensitive disposition towards the Court.
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Id., ¶¶ 35, 54

American Convention, supra note 96, art. 51(1) (emphasis added) [reproduced in the accompanying
notebook at Tab 4]
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108

Id., ¶ 48
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49. In a case before the Court, formal notification of the application does not
occur automatically but requires a preliminary review by the President in order to
determine whether the basic requirements of that action have been met. This is
spelled out in Article 27 of the Rules in force, which reflects the long-standing
practice of the Court…
51. In the instant case, the request for withdrawal presented by the Commission
occurred before the President of the Court was able to conduct the preliminary
review of the application and, consequently, before he was in a position to order
the notification of same. The President had not even been apprised of the
communication…by which the Commission notified the Government that the case
had been referred to the Court…109
The Court therefore concluded that the withdrawal occurred after the Commission
referred the case and before the Court accepted jurisdiction, and it ultimately recognized the
withdrawal as legitimate (while upholding Peru’s objections on other grounds).110
It is logical to conclude that States Parties may similarly withdraw a referral from the
ICC before the ICC has taken any steps to exercise jurisdiction. As the current Prosecutor has
noted, “neither referrals nor private communications automatically ‘trigger’ the powers of the
Prosecutor.”111 Instead, once a case is referred to the ICC, the Prosecutor must “conduct an
analysis”112 and evaluate the information made available to him;113 determine whether there is a
reasonable basis to proceed and commence an investigation;114 “notify all States Parties and
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Id., ¶¶ 48, 49, 51 (emphasis added)

Id., ¶¶ 51-63. The Court does not actually conclude on the withdrawal issue; it merely proceeds on the
presumption that the withdrawal was not “unjustified or arbitrary.” Id., ¶ 51

110

111

Annex to the “Paper on some policy issues before the Office of the Prosecutor”: Referrals and
Communications, p.1, available at http://www.icccpi.int/library/organs/otp/policy_annex_final_210404.pdf [hereinafter Annex to the Policy Paper]
[reproduced in the accompanying notebook at Tab 31]
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Id.
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ICC Statute, supra note 1, art. 53(1) [reproduced in the accompanying notebook at Tab 1]

114

Id., art. 18(1)
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those States which… would normally exercise jurisdiction over the crimes concerned;”115 and,
finally, initiate an investigation.116 The Prosecutor additionally has stated that “not every
situation can be immediately investigated” and that “some situations must be carefully monitored
for some time.”117
The Rome Statute and the ICC Rules of Procedure and Evidence do not state explicitly
when a case has been “taken up” or when the jurisdiction of the Court is officially in effect. The
natural language of Article 13 of the Rome Statute, stating that the Court may exercise its
jurisdiction if a referral is made, suggests that the Court or the Prosecutor must take affirmative
action to accept jurisdiction, analogous to Article 51 of the American Convention. The current
Prosecutor’s statements indicate his position that his response to a referral by gathering and
assessing of relevant information represents the commencement of the ICC process.118
Alternatively, the Inter-American Court, which uses initial procedures similar to those of the
ICC,119 noted that its own participation begins “with the notification of the other party.”120
The fact is virtually indisputable, in light of the Prosecutor’s statements and the Rome
Statute regime, that a temporal gap exists between the referral of a case to the ICC and the actual
exercise of the ICC’s jurisdiction, assuming the Prosecutor does not begin his analysis the
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Id.

116

Id., art. 53(1)

Annex to the Policy Paper, supra note 111, pp. 3-4 [reproduced in the accompanying notebook at Tab
31]
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Id., pp. 1-4
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Rules of Procedure of the Inter-American Court of Human Rights, arts. 32-35, reprinted in Basic
Documents Pertaining to Human Rights in the Inter-American System, OEA/Ser.L/V/I.4 rev.9 (2003)
[reproduced in the accompanying notebook at Tab 14]; ICC Statute, supra note 1, art. 18(1) and (2)
[reproduced in the accompanying notebook at Tab 1]
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moment he opens his mail. The admitted existence of this gap sufficiently satisfies the IACHR
holding and establishes the possibility that a referring party (including the Security Council) can
withdraw a case within this limited window under the Rome Statute as well. The recognition of
this possibility by the ICC could show flexibility and offer comfort to both States Parties and
those States considering accession to the Rome Statute. This possibility also could provide
political cover for those States (or the Security Council) whose referral is met with immediate or
severe protestation by its own citizens, its neighbors, or the international community. While the
current Prosecutor has expressed firmly that a State may not withdraw a case already well under
investigation, he has shown creativity and flexibility with ICC law in his Policy Paper and might
consider this accommodating, though limited, possibility.
The problem, of course, from a State’s perspective is that such a withdrawal could
provide temporary cover but does not allow the State to fully escape the Court’s jurisdiction. As
long as a State remains Party to the Rome Statute and its acceptance of the Court’s general
jurisdiction remains in place, the Prosecutor may still exert his proprio motu power with respect
to that State. If sufficient conditions exist to prompt a State to referral a situation in the first
place, then the Prosecutor may well agree enough to exert that power once a case is withdrawn.
The only real escape for a truly determined State would be via a withdrawal of a referral in the
limited circumstances discussed here, followed immediately by the acceptance of an amendment
to the Rome Statute, at which point the State could withdraw from the Statute fully “with
immediate effect”, pursuant to Article 121 of the Statute.121 Even in this scenario, where a State
were to successfully dodge the formal commencement of an investigation or prosecution, one
ICC analyst has stated that “if there were breaches of the substantive provisions of the Rome
121

ICC Statute, supra note 1, art. 121(6) [reproduced in the accompanying notebook at Tab 1]
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Statute on a State’s territory or by its nationals prior to withdrawal, those offenses would still
come within the jurisdiction of the Court even if the prosecution has not been commenced before
withdrawal.”122 This is perhaps one more example of the drafters’ careful construction of the
Statute and reinforces the idea that the drafters deliberately sought to bind a State to its statutory
obligations.

2.

The case law and legal analysis of the other international human rights
bodies not only affirms competence de la competence and rejects
unilateral withdrawal from treaty obligations, but also establishes a
higher threshold of interpretation for human rights treaties

The case law and legal analysis of the other international human rights bodies reaffirms
the prerogative of international courts to determine their own jurisdiction and rejects the ability
of a State to withdraw from treaty obligations or the jurisdiction of the requisite court, just as
their statutory and treaty counterparts do. The International Court of Justice in particular defined
some of the basic limitations to withdrawal or modifications of obligations under an international
agreement. However, this case law and analysis also establishes a higher plane of obligation and
greater restrictions on the ability of a State Party to withdraw or derogate from human rights
treaty. The Inter-American Court and the ICCPR Human Rights Committee have clarified and
strengthened the nature of human rights treaty. This law and analysis further establish that a
State Party cannot unilaterally withdraw from its obligations under a human rights treaty.

a.

The International Court of Justice

Roger S. Clark, ‘Article 127: Withdrawal’, ¶ 7, in Triffterer, ed., supra note 38, [reproduced in the
accompanying notebook at Tab 48]
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The International Court of Justice addressed the most famous (or notorious) attempt by a
State to unilaterally evade its treaty obligations and sidestep a court’s jurisdiction in the case of
Nicaragua v. United States.123 In 1984, Nicaragua announced that it was filing a case against the
United States at the ICJ, pursuant to the Treaty of Friendship, Commerce and Navigation
between the two countries, over U.S. support of Nicaraguan rebels. In a transparent attempt to
preempt the case, the U.S. notified the ICJ three days prior to the filing that the U.S. had
“modified” its declaration of recognition of the ICJ’s compulsory jurisdiction, such that the
declaration “shall not apply to disputes with any Central American State or arising out of or
related to events in Central America,” and stating that “this proviso shall take effect
immediately.”124 The United States then argued at the ICJ that “States have the sovereign right o
qualify an acceptance of the Court’s compulsory jurisdiction.”125
The Court laid out the fundamental precepts of jurisdiction and withdrawal (or
modification) in denying the United States’ contention. The Court noted that ‘both Parties
apparently recognize that a modification of a declaration which only takes effect after the Court
has been validly seised does not affect the Court’s jurisdiction;126 that is, once the Court has
exercised jurisdiction over a case, neither party can then unilaterally exert some effect over that
jurisdiction. The Court then noted that the United States’ attempted modification was really an
attempt to exempt itself from its obligations vis-à-vis the Court’s jurisdiction under the bilateral

Case Concerning Military and Paramilitary Activities in and against Nicaragua (Nicaragua v. United
States of America)(Jurisdiction of the Court and Admissibility of the Application) ICJ Reports 1984, 392
[hereinafter Nicaragua] [reproduced in the accompanying notebook at Tab 17]
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Id., ¶ 53
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treaty in question.127 While a State is free to enter into such obligations with respect to other
States, it cannot then freely break legal obligations established. The Court cited the customary
legal concept of pacta sunt servanda128 to clarify that good faith is “one of the basic principles
governing the creation and performance of legal obligations… Thus interested States may take
cognizance of unilateral declarations and place confidence in them, and are entitled to require
that the obligation thus created be respected.”129 The Court concluded that such a modification
as attempted by the United States required a “reasonable time” of notice,130 and it thereby
famously rejected the United States’ claim and defined one of the best-known rules with regard
to the issue of withdrawal.
The ICJ later briefly expanded on its holding in Nicaragua in the case of Cameroon v.
Nigeria.131 Citing Nicaragua to address the unilateral opting into obligations under a treaty, the
Court noted that “withdrawal ends existing consensual bonds, while deposit establishes such
bonds. The effect of withdrawal is therefore purely and simply to deprive other States which
have already accepted the jurisdiction of the Court of the right they had to bring proceedings
before it against the withdrawing State.”132 This holding makes clear that a withdrawal from a
treaty not only violates the legal obligations voluntarily entered into by a state, but it also
deprives the rights of those also legally protected under the treaty.
127

Id., ¶ 58

128

Rather than the VCLT, due to the bilateral treaty predating the VCLT.

129

Id., ¶ 60, citing its own jurisprudence in the Nuclear Tests cases

Id., ¶¶ 63, 65
Case Concerning the Land and Maritime Boundary between Cameroon and Nigeria (Cameroon v.
Nigeria)(Preliminary Objections) 1998 I.C.J. 275 (June 11, 1998) [hereinafter Cameroon] [reproduced in
the accompanying notebook at Tab 18]
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131

132

Id., ¶ 34
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The ICJ simultaneously defended the power of the Court to define its own jurisdiction
and rejected the prerogative of a State to unilaterally withdraw from, and therefore violate, its
legal obligations under a treaty. This findings bolster the conclusions already established with
respect to the Rome State. Additionally, the Court’s language noting the deprivation of the
rights of other parties by a withdrawal helps clarify the special protection afforded to human
rights treaties, as is subsequently established by the Inter-American Court.

b.

The Inter-American Court of Human Rights

In a set of cases in the 1990’s, the Inter-American Court dealt simultaneously with issues
of interference with the Court’s competence de la competence, and unilateral withdrawal both
from a case and from a human rights treaty. The Inter-American Commission referred two cases
to the Inter-American Court in March and July of 1999 respectively, the Ivcher Bronstein
Case133 and the Constitutional Court Case.134 The Court in turn notified Peru of each of the
applications according to procedure.135 In response first to the Constitutional Court Case, the
Peruvian government simply returned the application to the Court and submitted a note to the
Court Secretariat stating that
On July 9, 1999, the Government of the Republic of Peru deposited with the
General Secretariat of the Organization of American States the instrument
wherein it declares that, pursuant to the American Convention on Human Rights,
the Republic of Peru is withdrawing the declaration consenting to the optional
clause concerning recognition of the contentious jurisdiction of the InterAmerican Court of Human Rights… The withdrawal of recognition of the
Ivcher Bronstein Case, (Competence), Judgment of September 24, 1999, Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. (Ser. C)
No. 54 (1999) [reproduced in the accompanying notebook at Tab 21]
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Constitutional Court Case, (Competence), Judgment of September 24, 1999, Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. (Ser.
C) No. 55 (1999) [reproduced in the accompanying notebook at Tab 20]
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Constitutional Court Case, supra note 135, ¶ 22 [reproduced in the accompanying notebook at Tab
20]; Ivcher Bronstein Case, supra note 133, ¶ 19 [reproduced in the accompanying notebook at Tab 21]
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Court’s contentious jurisdiction takes immediate effect as of the date on which
that instrument is deposited with the General Secretariat of the OAS, in other
words, July 9, 1999, and applies to all cases in which Peru has not answered the
application filed with the Court.136
Peru subsequently responded identically to the Ivcher Bronstein Case137 and
thereafter made no other response to either case.
The Court delivered its ruling on “the question Peru’s purported withdrawal of its
declaration recognizing the contentious jurisdiction of the Court and of its legal effects” in the
two cases the following September.138 The Court first noted that, not only does it possess the
inherent authority to determine whether it has jurisdiction in a given case, “as with any court or
tribunal,”139 but also that a State Party’s acceptance of the Court’s jurisdiction according to the
American Convention necessarily implies that the State also “accept[s] the Court’s right to settle
any controversy relative to its jurisdiction.”140 The Court consequently found that “recognition
of the Court’s binding jurisdiction is an ironclad clause to which there can be no limitations
except those expressly provided for” in the Convention.141 Using the Vienna Convention on the
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Constitutional Court Case, supra note 135, ¶ 23 [reproduced in the accompanying notebook at Tab 20]
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Ivcher Bronstein Case, supra note 133 , ¶ 23 [reproduced in the accompanying notebook at Tab 21]

Constitutional Court Case, supra note 135, at ¶ 31 [reproduced in the accompanying notebook at Tab
20]. The Court ruled on the two cases separately but delivered virtually identical holdings. From this
point, the memo will refer and cite specifically to the holding of the Constitutional Court Case, with the
understanding that the language and conclusions are nearly identical to those in the Ivcher Bronstein
Case, that case having only minor grammatical and formatting differences as presented by the University
of Minnesota Human Rights Library online. The legal holdings of both cases are reproduced in full in the
accompanying notebook at Tabs 22 and 23.

138

139

Id., ¶ 31
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Law of Treaties as a guide,142 and noting the absence in the American Convention of any
provision for withdrawing recognition of the Court’s jurisdiction,143 the Court concluded that a
State Party to the American Convention “can only release itself of its obligations under the
Convention by following the provisions that the treaty itself stipulates.”144 In these cases, “the
only avenue the State has to disengage itself from the Court’s binding contentious jurisdiction is
to denounce the Convention as a whole,” in accordance with the Convention provisions, which
additionally require one year’s notice.145
The Court then moved to a broader discussion of human rights treaties, noting first that to
allow a State Party to defy the Convention itself would effectively be to allow that State to
suppress or restrict the human rights that the Convention exists to protect.146 The Court stated
that human rights treaties “are inspired by a set of higher common values (centered around the
protection of the human person)…and have a special character that sets them apart from other
treaties.”147 Citing its own case law and that of several cases from the ICJ and the European
Court of Human Rights in support of the rigorous enforcement of human rights treaties,148 the
Court contended that a State that accepts the Court’s jurisdiction under the Convention “binds
itself to the whole of the convention and is fully committed to guaranteeing the international
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protection of human rights that the Convention embodies.”149 Ultimately, given the rigorous
construction of the Convention and the elevated nature of human rights treaties, “States cannot
expect to have the same amount of discretion” in human rights cases as they may have in
“international disputes involving purely interstate litigation.”150
The Court concluded with the finding that
The American Convention is very clear that denunciation is of “this Convention”
(Article 78) as a whole, and not denunciation of or “release” from parts or clauses
thereof, since that would undermine the integrity of the whole. Applying the
criteria of the Vienna Convention (Article 56(1)), it does not appear to have been
the Parties’ intention to allow this type of denunciation or release; nor can
denunciation or release be inferred from the character of the American
Convention as a human rights treaty.151
In closing, the Court also cited Nicaragua v. United States in reiterating the broader
principle that “in order for an optional clause to be unilaterally terminated, the pertinent rules of
the law of treaties must be applied. Those rules clearly preclude any possibility of a termination
or ‘release’ with ‘immediate effect’.”152
The Inter-American Court expanded its jurisprudence on human rights treaties a few
years later in the case of Caesar v. Trinidad and Tobago153and affirmed the principle that “the
denunciation clause under the American Convention… was surrounded by temporal limitations

149

Id., ¶ 45

150

Id., ¶ 47

151

Id., ¶ 50

152

Id., ¶ 52
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so as not to allow it to undermine the protection of human rights thereunder.”154 Trinidad and
Tobago is one of several Caribbean nations that continues to employ “corporal punishment” as
part of its penal system; for example, some crimes are still punished by flogging with a “cat-onine tails”.155 A number of these nations have denounced and withdrawn from the American
Convention over controversy and conflict with the Convention due to such practices. Due to
such controversy and in anticipation of the filing of formal cases, Trinidad and Tobago
denounced the Convention in May of 1998156 pursuant to Article 78 of the Convention, which
requires one year of notice and (similar to the Rome Statute) stipulates that “such a denunciation
shall not have the effect of releasing the State Party concerned from the obligations contained in
this Convention with respect to any ac that may constitute a violation of those obligations and
that has been taken by that state prior to the effective date of denunciation.”157 One day before
the denunciation took effect in May of 1999, the Inter-American Commission filed a case against
Trinidad and Tobago at the Court, followed by a succession of additional cases, all based on acts
and incidents occurring prior to Trinidad’s denunciation.158 Trinidad and Tobago declined to
participate in any of the subsequent proceedings before the Court. The Caesar ruling is the
conclusion of only one of these cases, but the Court members elaborated at length on the issue of
denunciation in this case especially.
Caesar (Separate Opinion of Judge A.A. Cançado Trinade), ¶ 57 [reproduced in the accompanying
notebook at Tab 23]
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The Court addressed the effects of denunciation in its initial establishment of jurisdiction
over the case. Noting that Article 78 of the Convention prevents a State from evading its
obligations prior to denunciation,159 the Court turned to the Vienna Convention on the Law of
Treaties to assess the general treaty principles:
In interpreting the American Convention in accordance with the general rules of
treaty interpretation enshrined in Article 31(1) of the Vienna Convention on the
Law of Treaties, bearing in mind the object and purpose of the American
Convention, this Tribunal, in the exercise of the authority conferred on it by
Article 62(3) of the American Convention, must act in a manner that preserves the
integrity of the provisions of Article 62(1) of the Convention. It would be
unacceptable
to
subordinate these provisions to restrictions that would render inoperative the
Court’s jurisdictional role, and consequently, the human rights protection system
established in the Convention.160
The Court thus not only affirmed the importance of the Vienna Convention in
interpreting such treaties, but also made a profound statement regarding the implications of a
State’s attempt to withdraw from its obligations under a human rights treaty.
The concurring judges took the opportunity in Caesar to expound further on the
principles of human rights treaties. In a short concurrence, Judge Oliver Jackman invoked the
principle of pacta sunt servanda, noting that “the principle that states should abide in good faith
by the terms of treaties into which they voluntarily enter is the bedrock of international comity
and international law.”161 He also pointed out the enshrinement of this principle in the Vienna
Convention.162 Judge Jackman then expanded this concept with regard to human rights treaties
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(echoing the Court in the Ivcher Bronstein and Constitutional Court cases), stating “it ought to
be obvious that good faith compliance is of even greater importance in the area of international
human rights law, where what is at stake is not the impersonal interests of states but the
protection of the fundamental rights of the individual.”163 He proclaimed that Trinidad’s
“contumelious” refusal to abide by the obligations of a treaty which, by definition, extended a
State’s obligations beyond withdrawal “represents a gratuitous attack on the Rule of Law.”164
Judge A.A. Cançado Trinade, in his own concurrence, addressed at great length the
special nature of human rights treaties and the consequent mandate that denunciations or
limitations under such treaties cannot be used to detract from the protection of human rights. He
cites the Vienna Convention as establishing that “in practice… in the international law of human
rights, somewhat distinctly, there has been a clear and special emphasis on the element of the
object and purpose of the treaty, so as to ensure an effective protection… of the guaranteed
rights.”165 He later reaffirms that the Vienna Convention “open[s] the way to the taking into
account of the nature or specificity of certain treaties.”166 He also cites to the “converging caselaw” of the Inter-American Court and the European Court of Human Rights, in consideration of
the Vienna Convention, as furthering the establishment of a special nature for human rights
treaties which, in turn, requires special protections.167
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In light of the Vienna Conventions and the case law of the human rights courts, Judge
Trinade concludes that “permissible restrictions (limitations and derogations)” in human rights
treaties must be “restrictively interpreted”168 and that “certain limits have been established with
regard to the denunciation of such treaties.”169 Specifically with respect to the American
Convention, he highlights again that the denunciation clause in Article 78 is “surrounded by
temporal limitations” that underscores the lasting protection of human rights and the requisite
prohibition on a State’s unilaterally undermining those rights. He summarized his points by
stating
Thus, not even the institution of denunciation of treaties is so absolute in effects
as one might prima facie tend to assume. Despite its openness to manifestations of
State voluntarism, denunciation has, notwithstanding, been permeated with basic
considerations of humanity as well, insofar as treaties of a humanitarian character
are concerned. Ultimately, one is here faced with the fundamental, overriding and
inescapable principle of good faith (bona fides), and one ought to act
accordingly.170

c.

The International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights

The Human Rights Committee established by the International Covenant on Civil and
Political Rights has provided an important and relevant piece of legal analysis regarding
withdrawal of a party from a human rights treaty. In October of 1997, North Korea announced
its intention to withdraw from the ICCPR, in response to the resolution of a U.N. sub-
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commission criticizing North Korea’s human rights practices.171 In response, the Human Rights
Committee adopted “General Comment No. 26” shortly thereafter during its general session
deliberations.172 Without specifically mentioning North Korea, the General Comment outlined
the case against unilateral withdrawal from the ICCPR under customary international law.
The Committee first noted that in the absence of express provision in a treaty for
withdrawal or denunciation, the possibility of such must be evaluated according to the Vienna
Convention on the Law of Treaties, which establishes that the treaty is not subject to
denunciation or withdrawal "unless it is established that the parties intended to admit the
possibility of denunciation or withdrawal or a right to do so is implied from the nature of the
treaty."173 The Committee then stated that the existence of clear reference within the same treaty
to withdrawal in other respects (referring to Article 41(2) of the ICCPR allowing for withdrawal
of a declaration of recognition of the competence of the Committee174) indicates the awareness
and deliberate rejection of the possibility by the parties drafting the treaty.175 More broadly
speaking, the Committee found that a treaty that codifies and protects "universal human rights...
does not have a temporary character typical of treaties where a right of denunciation is deemed to
be admitted, notwithstanding the absence of a specific provision to that effect."176 Furthermore,
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similar to arguments made at the Inter-American Court, the Committee reiterated its view “as
evidenced by its long-standing practice” that the human rights enshrined in the ICCPR “belong
to the people living in the territory of the State party” and that the protection of those rights
“continues to belong to them” and not to any State Party or government.177 The Committee
concluded that international law does not allow a State Party to denounce or withdraw from the
ICCPR.178
The Committee’s brief response to North Korea’s attempt to pull out of the ICCPR
appropriately wraps up the discussion of withdrawal and obligations under a human rights treaty.
The Committee affirms the use of the VCLT in analyzing human rights treaties, and it echoes the
Inter-American Court in reiterating the particular bias against a State withdrawing from its
obligations under a human rights treaty. These same principles apply to the ICC, given that
possibility for withdrawal simply cannot be found in the Rome Statute.

d.

The unilateral withdrawal of a referral would violate the Rome Statute
according to the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties

The unilateral withdrawal of a State Party referral from the ICC would appear to violate the
Rome Statute according to the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties (VCLT).179 The
VCLT naturally qualifies as an “applicable treaty” for interpretation of the Rome Statute,
pursuant to Article 21 of the Statute.180 Gerhard Hafner, one of the drafters of the Rome Statute
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and a former member of the International Law Commission, has stated that “since the Statute
constitutes a treaty concluded among States after the entry into force of the VCLT, the latter is
applicable to the Statute in relation to States parties which are also Parties to the VCLT whereas
the other States Parties to the Statute have to resort to customary international law which
nevertheless has conformed to the regime of the VCLT.”181 Additionally, given the frequent use
of the VCLT by the other human rights bodies for addressing issues of withdrawal and
jurisdiction, the VCLT provides an appropriate means for analyzing this issue and complements
the preceding case law.
First and foremost, a withdrawal would contradict the VCLT’s provision requiring that a
treaty be interpreted with “the ordinary meaning” of its terms and “in the light of its object and
purpose.”182 The ordinary meaning of the terms of the Rome Statute appears to reject the
possibility of withdrawal of a referral. A withdrawal would only interfere with the functioning
of the Court, in contradiction with the object and purpose of the Statute, which is the prosecution
of “the most serious crimes of concern to the international community” through cooperation
between national jurisdictions and the Court.183 The preceding case law of the other human
rights bodies has elevated the meaning of this provision with respect to human rights treaties.
Applying the Inter-American Court’s ruling in Caesar, such a withdrawal “would render
inoperative the Court’s jurisdictional role, and consequently, the human rights protection system
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established” in the Rome Statute.184 Even if a State sought to withdraw a referral for the sake of
exercising its own criminal jurisdiction, the Statute provides a multitude of cooperative
procedural options that negate the need for unilateral action.
The VCLT also calls for the performance of treaty obligations in good faith;185 a unilateral
withdrawal directly violates this provision, as a withdrawal is a means of avoidance of the
obligations imposed by the Rome Statute. As Judge Jackman noted in Caesar, and the ICCPR
Human Rights Committee affirmed, “good faith compliance is of even greater importance in the
area of international human rights law, where what is at stake is not the impersonal interests of
states but the protection of the fundamental rights of the individual.”186
This attempt to avoid certain obligations under the Statute also implicates Article 44 of the
VCLT, which concerns “separability of treaty provisions.”187 Whether withdrawal of a referral
is seen as a State Party’s violation of the basic referral procedure, the admissibility or jurisdiction
procedural requirements, or the other obligations to cooperate with the Court, in any sense
withdrawal would be a State Party’s attempt to selectively apply the rules of the Rome Statute.
According to Article 44 of the VCLT, however, if a treaty provides a party the right to
“denounce, withdraw from or suspend the operation of the treaty” (as the Rome Statute does in
Articles 121 and 127), a party may take such action only vis-à-vis the whole treaty and not with
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respect “solely to particular clauses.” 188 Withdrawal does not meet the exceptions to Article 44:
State Party referral and cooperation is integral to the treaty as a whole,189 as such they are
essential bases to other States Parties consenting to participate in the Court,190 and continued
performance of the remainder of the remainder of the treaty would be manifestly unjust and
effectively impossible,191 at least with respect to that State Party. There is no justification under
this article for a State Party to the Rome Statute to suspend part of its obligations by withdrawing
its referral.
Finally, the VCLT allows for recourse to “the preparatory work of the treaty and the
circumstances of its conclusion” as a supplemental means of interpretation where the treaty
leaves the meaning of any terms “ambiguous or obscure.” The ordinary meaning of the Rome
Statute is fairly clear for the purposes of this discussion, but an examination of the draft history
together with the finished Statute overwhelmingly conveys that the drafters intended to preserve
the strong jurisdiction of the Court once exercised and bind States Parties to their obligations.

IV. Conclusion
International legal practice has overwhelmingly established that States may not withdraw
unilaterally withdraw from their treaty obligations. International human rights practice has
similarly established that human rights treaties are deliberately designed to protect human rights
and hold States accountable even after a State has withdrawn from the relevant treaty. The
Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties bolsters this practice and affirms that customary
188
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international law forbids States from abusing the absence of explicit provisions in a treaty
prohibiting withdrawal. This translates directly to the circumstances of the ICC, which was set
up to protect human rights and punish the most egregious abusers of those rights, but which also
lacks a clear prohibition of withdrawal of a referral once the Court has taken full jurisdiction.
The Rome Statute and its draft history together, together with international legal and human
rights practice, clearly forbid a State Party’s withdrawal of a referral to the International
Criminal Court, with one very limited exception.

a.

The role of the ICC does not change in the face of an attempted withdrawal

Ultimately, the role of the ICC does not change in the face of an attempted withdrawal.
The same issues of sovereignty, complementarity, and peace vs. justice exist; the individual
circumstances of a given situation must still be delicately considered; the universal obligation to
prosecute certain crimes remains; and the Court ultimately remains unable to truly enforce
violations of, or non-compliance with, the Rome Statute. The Statute “does not provide the
Assembly of States Parties with any power to sanction uncooperative state parties.”192
More importantly, an attempted withdrawal does not unavoidably truncate a case, foreclose
all other options, or immediately require an abandonment of cooperation. Current and former
members of the OTP have privately expressed that they would regard an attempted withdrawal
simply as a challenge to admissibility, which is a reasonable alternative interpretation of a given
State’s desire to withdraw a referral. A State may not desire to withdraw a referral necessarily to
interfere with a case in progress; rather, that State may simply overlook the alternative
procedural options. There is every reason to apply the other procedural provisions of the Rome
Matthew Happold, The International Criminal Court and the Lord's Resistance Army, MELBOURNE
JOURNAL OF INTERNATIONAL LAW, p. 159(26) Vol. 8 No. 1 ISSN: 1444-8602 [reproduced in the
accompanying notebook at Tab 57]
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Statute, rather than abandon the non-adversarial “cooperative division of labor” adopted by the
current Prosecutor. In any case, the OTP will not likely otherwise recognize a withdrawal of a
referral.

b.

Uganda is unlikely to actually withdraw its referral

The Ugandan government appears highly unlikely to actually attempt to withdraw its
referral to the ICC, based on numerous statements made by various government officials over the
past two years. Uganda appears to be fully aware that it cannot simply withdraw a referral from
the ICC, and that it must make some bona fide attempt at national prosecution in order to
challenge the continued admissibility of the pending cases at the ICC. Since President Museveni
first caused the international human rights uproar by suggesting that Uganda might withdraw its
referral:
-

the Ugandan chief peace negotiator has stated that “it’s only when we are armed with a
peace agreement and the LRA has gone through the (traditional Ugandan reconciliation)
mato-oput process that the ICC can be asked to review the indictments.”193

-

the government peace team publicist has acknowledged that the ICC will not drop arrest
warrants until it is convinced that peace and justice has been delivered to northern
Uganda194

-

the government peace team spokesman has said that “the Ugandan government can do
nothing against the ICC indictments. There is a process to be followed if the indictments
are to be lifted.”195
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-

President Museveni himself stated that Uganda will not ask the ICC to lift the arrest
warrants “before a final peace deal is completed” (implicitly conceding that the ICC must
be asked, not told)196

-

and one of the Ugandan interior ministers and negotiators has admitted that the ICC
indictments have made the LRA more cooperative, not less, and said that the indictments
cannot be withdrawn until the LRA abandons rebellion, signs a peace agreement, and
accepts to be integrated into the community197

These sentiments show that the Ugandan government is well aware that withdrawal of the
referral is not really an option, and that it must have grounds to challenge the admissibility of the
cases before the ICC if it truly wants the Court to relinquish the referral back to Uganda’s
jurisdiction. If nothing else, the ICC’s investigation and prosecution of the Ugandan cases have
facilitated the negotiation process and helped suspend the civil war; Museveni may even drive
the LRA criminals to seek protection at the ICC from the Ugandan government, as opposed to
the status quo. Regardless, the Court must proceed for the time being with the knowledge that
the crimes in question there are gruesome, widespread, and well-known, and that those with the
“greatest responsibility” are clearly identifiable.

c.

A recommendation: limited withdrawal and 2009 amendments
While it is clear that withdrawal of a referral is not currently a viable option under the

Rome Statute, there is at least one good reason to favor establishing a limited withdrawal option.
The Democratic Republic of Congo (DAR) and the Central African Republic (CAR) made
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here, you know how things move.” (emphasis added!)
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nearly identical referrals to the ICC. Rather than referring a specific situation that “specif[ies]
the relevant circumstances” and is accompanied by “supporting documentation,”198 both states
referred to the Prosecutor “the situation of crimes within the jurisdiction of the
Court…committed anywhere in the territory [of the referring State] since…entry into force of the
Rome Statute.”199 Both states have therefore relinquished broad, open-ended, unrestricted
jurisdiction to the ICC, from now until eternity.
The DRC and CAR presumably do not want the ICC’s jurisdiction “triggered” forever;
this would be an affront to notions of complementarity and sovereignty. Given that the
Prosecutor has worked closely and successfully with States Parties to create the self-referral
phenomenon, he should similarly work with States to negotiate the termination or withdrawal of
referrals, where appropriate. This is consistent with the Prosecutor’s cooperative, nonadversarial approach to policy at the ICC. Even States that make well-defined, limited selfreferrals may eventually want to re-exert control and jurisdiction over the situation, at the
conclusion of wars or conflicts, after succession of governments, etc. Similarly, the Rome
Statute does not define how or when a non-state party’s Article 12(3) declaration terminates.
Does the “rebuttable presumption” of Article 56 of the VCLT apply, or is the non-state party
bound to the same withdrawal procedure as States Parties under Article 127 of the Rome Statute?
The Ivory Coast made its declaration to the Court using very similar language as the DRC and
CAR State Party referrals. Presumably, the Ivory Coast wants its jurisdiction back eventually
also.
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With seven years from the Statute’s entry into force set to expire in the near future, the
Prosecutor should work with the Assembly of States Parties and the United Nations to define
these confusing concepts. The issues surrounding withdrawal of referrals affect all States
Parties, the basic functioning of the International Criminal Court, and ultimately, therefore, the
protection of human rights and the prosecution of the most serious crimes of concern to the
international community.
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